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BOOK REVIEWS
ON GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT. By Alf Ross.
Translated from Danish by Alastair Hannay and Thomas E.
Sheahan. London, Stevens and Sons Limited, 1975. Pp. 183.
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
For those concerned with the underlying philosophical
problems of criminal law, Professor Ross's book provides valu-
able insights. Not only does he present well reasoned views
of his own, but his critical evaluation of competing theories
introduces the reader to the thoughts of other thinkers, and
entices him to further study.
Ross challenges those who see morality as totally foreign
to the criminal law and its system of sanctions. Rather than
rejecting a relationship between morals and the penal law,
Ross develops in rigorous fashion the relationships between
the two. He develops in detail his view of the "conduct
influencing" role of moral judgments; and he argues that the
aim of the criminal law's system of sanctions is to govern the
conduct of those subject to it. Moral disapproval acts to
influence conduct. Thus, moral disapproval is a significant
factor in criminal sanctions. In Ross's words:
There can be no doubt that the moral stigma attached to
punishment is of great importance for the preventive ef-
fect of the penal system, both as a deterrent and as a
factor influencing moral attitudes. For many persons,
certainly, the shame and infamy attached to punishment
are a greater deterrent than the actual pain that it in-
volves, or at least function as a very serious addition to it.
Punishment, even a fine, is not experienced just as the
price one has to pay for doing a crime in the way one pays
for a cinema ticket. The moral stigma of punishment
must be assumed to be of particular importance for the
ability of criminal legislation to influence current moral
attitudes.'
Particularly does Ross refute those determinist thinkers
who take the position that because human conduct is gov-
erned by causal factors, moral judgments are meaningless.
He persuasively urges that even those who assert that
human conduct is determined by causal factors must admit
* Associate Professor. of Law, Louisiana State University.
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that moral judgments are meaningful if they influence
human conduct. 2 They become, in themselves, determining
factors. Ross makes his point in opposition to those who argue
that criminal sanctions should not reflect moral disapproval
but rather should function as a "morally neutral cure."'3
By "morality" Ross has reference to both "valuations and
attitudes of a directly moral nature concerning certain forms
of behavior" and "the attitude of respect for law because it is
the law of the land."'4 Ross's reference is not only to our direct
moral evaluation of the conduct itself, i.e., our feeling that
such conduct is morally reprehensible in itself (Ross's exam-
ples are murder and theft); he also has reference to the moral
obligation to act or refrain from acting simply because to do
otherwise is proscribed by law. This view is based on the
theory that one feels an internal moral obligation to follow
the law. One would concede that there are some criminal
statutes where there is no moral duty involved other than a
general moral duty to abide by the law. Examples might be
statutes setting speed limits or requiring the report of income
on tax forms.
Ross argues that it is not merely the fear of punishment
that prevents law breaking. Does one, for example, not shop-
lift merchandise simply because if one is caught one will be
subject to a $500.00 fine (and the possibility of
imprisonment-unlikely for a first offender)? Clearly not.
Most people do not steal because of internal moral forces
which simply proscribe doing such an act even if, under the
circumstances, one has no doubt that he will evade apprehen-
sion. Is the same true of reporting income on one's tax form?
If not, this provides a good example of the breakdown of
adherence to the criminal law without the force of moral
sanctions. The dangers of "getting caught" and the fears of
penalties alone are often not enough for effective enforce-
ment of the law.
Similarly, the moral stigma attached to punishment is a
2. Ross admits that certain theories of the so-called "hard determinists"
are incompatible with moral responsibility. Ross argues that such theories
can be reduced to the absurd position that even moral judgments themselves
are determined. See Chapter 5, sections 13 and 14, pp. 137-145. Ross attempts,
however, to avoid becoming embroiled in the classic battle between "free will"
and "determinism." See Chapter 5, Section 10, pp. 129-134.
3. P. 90.
4. Id.
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significant factor in many cases. While there may be little
moral stigma attached to paying a ticket for speeding, the lack
of moral stigma may in itself be a factor which encourages
one to speed if he is reasonably assured of either not being
caught or a small fine if caught. However, take the case of a
prominent citizen charged with driving while under the
influence of alcohol (particularly if his arrest is publicized). Is
not the moral stigma a greater penalty than the fine and
possible loss of driving privileges? And further, does the
moral stigma associated with the punishment not serve as a
conduct influencing factor? If the reader disagrees, then he
should read and challenge for himself Professor Ross's well
developed logic in support of his position.
In his "pragmatic view of morality, ' 5 Ross does not join
issue with "a cognitivist philosophy of values."6 Although the
existence of the sense of moral obligation is assumed to be
self evident his essay simply does not examine critically "the
justification of the values which moral reactions defend. ' 7
The core of this set of theses [Ross's pragmatic view of
morality] is that morality has no higher "meaning" or
"justification," than the pragmatic one of being instru-
mental in the defence of a presupposed system of values.8
Ross sees a parallel between the pragmatic theory of
morality and the juridical theory of punishment: both have
the practical end of guiding human behavior.
Ross's view of the role of moral values and their sig-
nificance to the criminal law does not lead to a dissertation on
the sources of those values themselves. While he agrees that
"we cannot accept our spontaneous moral attitudes as man-
ifestations of eternal truths," he makes it clear that the "at-
tempt to rationalize our experienced morality"9 is beyond the
scope of his book. That is not to say that Ross discourages
such analysis, rather he sees it as necessary:
We must believe that the morality which develops in a
society and is experienced by its individual members as
self-evident requirements is in reality (that is, without
5. P. 156.
6. P. 157.
7. Id.
8: P. 156.
9. P. 92.
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their being aware of it) directed by needs and interests. It
is the moral critic's task, therefore, in his analysis and
initial reflection, to test the positive, experienced moral-
ity in order to discover the purposes it was made to serve,
and how it is to be evaluated in light of consciously ac-
cepted norms.' 0
His concern is basically with "morality's capacity to guide
human behavior"" and with the function of morality, rather
than with the values defended by moral reaction. Neverthe-
less, given the force of morality in a society, the writer agrees
with Ross that its power must be recognized as a force serv-
ing society's interest in maintaining conformity with its so-
cial norms (often expressed as criminal statutes). As Ross
says:
[U]ntil chemists have invented effective anti-crime pills,
they [jurists] should insist that it is moral forces that
cement society, and that it is therefore those very forces
that criminal legislation must try to mobilise in the fight
against crime.' 2
Ross eschews what he calls "arrogant scientific claims"' 3
that moral judgments and theories of moral responsibility are
merely outmoded prejudices with no place in modern penal
theory. Punishments, for Ross, have not only an element of
suffering but also an element of disapproval of the offender's
conduct. He expresses a great fear of a morally neutral con-
cept of punishment:
When the judge . . . is replaced by the manipulator and
the therapist, when the criminal law is based on a
philosophy of treating citizens like mice or patients with-
out responsibility, the vista that opens up is not so much
that of a criminal's paradise as that of a totalitarian state
with its mechanical and unlimited power over the indi-
vidual.' 4
Another aspect of Professor Ross's thesis which should
interest Louisiana lawyers is his view of moral and legal
responsibility for one's acts. To Ross, the basic question of
10. Id.
11. P. 158.
12. P. 99.
13. Id.
14. P. 70.
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responsibility (moral and legal) seems to be whether the de-
fendant "could have acted otherwise than he did.' 15 Certain-
ly, as Ross points out, we do not hold responsible one who had
no opportunity or ability to act otherwise. Similarly, Ross
suggests, we do not hold one responsible where under the
circumstances, he could not have been expected to act other-
wise than he did.
The writer submits that Louisiana's defense of justifica-
tion is significantly more restrictive and that the concept
presented by Ross should be considered. 16 Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a motorist notices that one of the tail or brake lights
on his automobile has just then become defective and is in
need of change. Suppose further, that as he is driving to the
service station to have it repaired, an officer cites him for
operating a vehicle not equipped in conformity with the re-
quirements of the Highway Regulatory Act. 7 Given these
facts, should the defendant have been expected to have acted
otherwise? Should he have immediately parked his car and
called for the tow truck to haul his vehicle to the station for
repair of the lamp?
Some would argue that technically the answer is yes and
that the motorist's failure to do so and his continued opera-
tion of the vehicle violated the statute. They would point to
the discretion of the district attorney to dismiss the charge 8
and to the discretion of the court to suspend the sentence in
the event of conviction. 19 The practical effect, they would
15. P. 167.
16. La. R.S. 14:18(5) and (6) provide:
The fact that an offender's conduct is justifiable, although otherwise
criminal, shall constitute a defense to prosecution for any crime based on
that conduct. This defense of justification can be claimed under the
following circumstances: ...
(5) When the crime consists of a failure to perform an affirmative duty
and the failure to perform is caused by physical impossibility; or (6) When
any crime, except murder, is committed through the compulsion of
threats by another of death or great bodily harm, and the offender
reasonably believes the person making the threats is present and would
immediately carry out the threats if the crime were not committed; or...
17. See La. R.S. 32:304(a) and La. R.S. 32:306. Of course, the driver's
awareness of the infraction is immaterial in determining his criminal liabil-
ity. This is an offense which imposes liability without requiring that the
offender operate his auto knowing or having reasonable ground to believe
that a piece of equipment is defective.
18. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 61, 691.
19. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.
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argue, is the same. However, theoretically there is a great
difference between saying "he is not guilty under the cir-
cumstances because he could not have been expected to act
otherwise" and saying "he is guilty but under the cir-
cumstances he should not be prosecuted (or if prosecuted, not
required to pay a fine)." On the one hand the legal conditions
for imposing responsibility (and sanctions) have not been met,
whereas, on the other, those conditions have been met and it
is only the exercise of discretion by the authorities which
prevents an unjust result.
Professor Ross presents many thoughts about the nature
and purpose of criminal law. He raises many interesting
points in addition to those few which have been discussed
here. They are well reasoned and should, at least, be care-
fully considered by those concerned with the underlying pur-
poses and values of our criminal justice system. An evalua-
tion of why we penalize for crime may indeed give some
indication as regards fundamental questions concerning how
we penalize for crime. For those interested in reading a
philosophical treatise which will challenge and stimulate the
intellect, Professor Ross's work is highly recommended.
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